Spain's public fi nances have been under signifi cant stress during the crisis, despite precrisis fi scal surpluses and low levels of public debt. The impact of the crisis and an initial phase of counter-cyclical activism exacerbated the existing (structural) fi scal vulnerabilities.
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Introduction
After five years of economic and financial crisis, 2014 marked the beginning of a recovery of the Spanish economy, with the recovery steadily gaining strength over the year, marking the end of a period of economic contraction and employment destruction without precedent in the recent history of the country. The depth of the impact when the global economic shocks hit exposed the significant vulnerabilities of the Spanish economy, given cumulated imbalances in the pre-crisis period, in particular, excessive private sector indebtedness (largely financed with external funds), excessive reliance on the construction sector, and an overall loss of competitiveness (see, for example, Ortega and Peñalosa, 2013). During the crisis there was a steady adjustment of economic imbalances, but the gradual correction of the legacies of the recession remains a challenge.
In this paper we are interested in the public finance aspect of the crisis. While before the crisis the Spanish government had fiscal surpluses and low levels of public debt (almost half of the euro area reference), it was soon clear that the fiscal space available to pursue counter-cyclical policies was very limited, given the structural nature of the fiscal imbalances built up before the crisis. This, together with the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2010, put Spain's public finances under serious strain. To tackle fiscal imbalances, a significant number of tax, public spending and institutional policy measures were implemented between 2010 and 2014, some of them with a medium-to longterm bearing on fiscal sustainability.
In the rest of the paper we describe the evolution of public finances in Spain through the financial crisis, framing crisis-related fiscal policy measures within medium-term economic trends. We start by describing briefly the macroeconomic situation and how the crisis unfolded in Spain (Section 2), before focusing on the situation of public finances in the pre-crisis period and the fiscal policy response to the financial crisis (Section 3). Section 4 is dedicated to the assessing the degree to which policy responses to the financial crisis were used as opportunities to introduce reforms of a structural nature and Section 5 provides some policy conclusions.
Impact of the financial crisis: the macro picture

National income
In the three decades prior to the financial crisis the Spanish economy experienced an unprecedented period of sustained economic growth, marked by the milestones of the integration in the European Union in 1986, and the adoption of the euro in 1999. Between 1970 and 2007 GDP per capita more than doubled in real terms. In particular, in the 1999-2007 euro era real GDP per capita increased by close to 20%, during a period of large net immigration, with average real GDP growth of some 4% per year. The reasons for this significant economic expansion can be linked to the fall in interest rates and the expansion of credit upon entry in the euro area, with the associated impulse to domestic demand and the extraordinary development of a housing market (see, for example, Estrada et al., 2009 ). Nevertheless, lack of supply response and low productivity growth generated a loss of competitiveness, a real exchange rate appreciation, sizeable current account deficits, and the build-up of external debt (see, for example, Hernández de Cos and Jimeno, 2013).
The subsequent economic crisis in Spain was severe. Between 2007 and 2013 real per capita GDP fell by 9%, while in 2014 this measure of welfare was still 7.6% lower than the peak year (2007) with part of the recovery due to outwards migration since 2013. In the euro area, only the countries subject to an Economic Adjustment Programme (i.e. Greece, Ireland and Portugal) suffered tougher downturns. This recession was more acute than those in the mid-1970s and early 1990s. Second dip of the double-dip recession, from 2011Q2 to end 2013. As discussed by Ortega and Peñalosa (2013) , these three periods presented common features (persistent reduction of domestic demand; net positive contribution of the external sector; job destruction; downward trend in house prices), but also some idiosyncratic features. The heterogeneity of the latter among recession stages was linked to the different fiscal policy actions, different financial conditions, and the varying sensitivity of prices and wages to the unfavourable cyclical situation. The patterns of balance sheet adjustment and deleveraging by firms and households also changed over these years.
Labour markets
The impact of the economic downturn in Spain is especially visible in labour market data. Indeed, the ratio of the number of unemployed over population (16-64 years) surpassed its previous peak (of 15% in 1994) in 2011, and continued increasing to 20% by 2013 (Figure 1 ). This is the largest and steepest increase in unemployment of the last three decades. At the same time, the depth of the impact of the crisis on unemployment is exemplified by the dramatic fact that in 2 years there was a full reversion of the significant employment gains witnessed in the Spanish economy during the previous decade of economic expansion. This aggregate picture hides some differences between age groups. As Figure 1 shows, the largest increase in unemployment occurred among those aged between 16 and 29 (17ppt between 2007 and 2013). Nonetheless, the unemployment rate (defined as a per cent of population) of those aged 55-64 also increased, by 8ppt, a feature that had not been seen during previous crises, also due to the fact that participation rates did not fall significantly among this group in the recent crisis in contrast to previous episodes. Also employment rates plummeted among younger workers, while in the 55-64 age interval remained broadly constant As of 2010, though, nominal wage growth slowed, on the back of the prolonged economic recession, consecutive labour market reforms, and tighter public sector wage settlements. 2 In a related fashion, it is worth mentioning that during the crisis there was a significant reduction in unit labour costs and an overall improvement of competitiveness, as measured by standard indicators, in such a way that a sizeable correction of pre-crisis cumulated imbalances took place.
Public finance response
This section explains how the position of Spain's public finances transformed from before the crisis to after, why the crisis resulted in the significant fiscal deterioration that was seen, and what the overall fiscal response was.
Fiscal stance before the crisis
In 2007 the Spanish general government accounts registered a fiscal surplus (of 2% of GDP) for the third consecutive year, while the public debt to GDP ratio stood at 35.5%, compared with the euro area average of 66%. Public debt in 2007 was at its lowest level for three decades. Between 1996 and 2007 the public debt to GDP ratio had been reduced by 30ppt, due to high real and nominal economic growth, decreasing interest rates and healthy fiscal positions. The 9% of GDP improvement in the budget balance between 1995 and 2007 was partly the result of the business cycle, and partly attributable to the decline in debt interest payments, above all because of lower interest rates as a result of EMU accession. The rest of the adjustment was due to the exceptional 2 In particular, some studies show that the most recent labour market reform (2012) had a positive effect on wage moderation (see Banco de España, 2014). Also public wage leadership in a situation of economic slack has been claimed to be a factor beneficial for labour market adjustments in Spain (Lamo et al., 2015) . increase in tax revenues, largely linked to the real estate expansion, 3 which more than offset significant tax cuts which were enacted just before the onset of the crisis (see Table 1 and Banco de España, 2011).
In 2007 public spending stood at 38.9% of GDP. Social protection constituted the most significant part (33%), followed by the basic welfare services of health and education (25%) (Figure 4a ).
Within social protection, half of the spending was on old age benefits (Figure 4b ), while unemployment spending accounted for 12%, despite the decade long economic expansion. In the pre-crisis period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , primary public expenditure, net of unemployment benefits, in particular spending by the subnational levels of government, grew in real terms (using the consumer price index) at an annual rate of 4%, above trend real GDP growth (see Banco de España, 2011).
The pro-cyclical bias in spending is a documented fact for OECD economies, and tends to be linked to buoyant public revenues (see De Castro et al., 2014) .
General government tax revenues (including actual and imputed social contributions and capital taxes) increased by close to 5% of GDP between 1995 and 2007 to reach 37.4% of GDP in the latter year (with total revenues at 40.9%). Actual social security contributions ( Figure 5 ) were one third of the total (11.9% of GDP), similar to direct taxes (12.7% of GDP) and indirect taxes (11.5% of GDP). Within the last, stamp duties and property taxes amounted to some 2.5% of GDP, a significant amount, in absolute and relative terms, which was related to the housing sector boom. 3.2. How did the crisis affect the public finances?
In 2008 the fiscal balance deteriorated from the 2% of GDP surplus described above to a fiscal deficit of 4.4% (i.e. 6.4ppt weakening in just one year), exposing the vulnerabilities of Spain's public finances. On the one hand, public revenues dropped by 4.2ppt, as pre-crisis temporary revenue windfalls unwound, while spending increased by 2.2% of GDP due to the usual inertia of budgeted expenses.
Thus, the deterioration of the government balance was of a structural nature, with the cyclicallyadjusted budget deficit moving, according to current European Commission estimates, 5 from a The subsequent continued worsening of the fiscal situation due to the depth of the crisis, including the adverse effects on the Spanish economy's level of potential output, was further exacerbated in 2010 through contagion from the Greek and Irish crises. The associated pressure of markets also affected the national financial system, which in turn exacerbated pressure on the public finances, as it had in other countries, though mainly at the very beginning of the crisis. 6 3.3. What was the fiscal response to the crisis?
In Figure 8 we present a counterfactual, static exercise in which we assess which might have been the path of the budget balance, revenues and expenditures in the absence of policy action. 7 From the figures it is apparent that after some initial policy loosening, the absence of policy action as of 2010 would have led to unsustainable public deficit dynamics. In the baseline exercise, absent policy action, the public deficit would have increased monotonically over the considered period. In 5 AMECO database, March 2015. 6 See, for example, Banco de España (2011) and Hernández de Cos, Izquierdo and Urtasun (2011). 7 To do so we recreate in an iterative way government revenues and expenditures in each year netting out the estimated direct effects of discretionary policy measures. On the revenue side we use the estimates provided in Table 1 plus other, smaller measures taken from Gil et al. (2015) . On the expenditure side, for social payments we use the estimates provided in Table 2 . For public wages, we take as measures the wage freezes The initial, counter-cyclical response to the crisis, led to the implementation of expansionary fiscal policy measures, many of them pursued in the framework of a coordinated EU plan. The positive impact on the economy is hard to assess, though some studies claim that it would have been limited and temporary, given in particular short implementation lags for spending plans (Bouthevillain et al., 2009 ). The fact is that the expansionary measures contributed to a deficit deterioration that was already significant due to the economic downturn, the unwinding of transitory revenue factors, and also the delayed impact of two broad-based tax-cutting reforms (personal income and corporate 8 The net decrease in primary public expenditure (i.e. when interest payments are excluded) between 2009 and 2014 amounted to 3.8 percentage points of GDP. income) that were approved before the crisis emerged (see Figure 8 and tables 1 and 2). All in all, the public deficit reached a historical peak of 11.0% of GDP in 2009, down from the also historical The consolidation strategy defined by the government intended to bring forward the bulk of the adjustment to the 2010-2011 period, underpinning it with spending cuts, many of which were of a structural nature. The public finances outcome at end-2010, entailing a general government deficit equivalent to 9.4% of GDP, showed that the measures adopted in 2010 had proven effective in reversing the upward trajectory of the budget deficit. Nevertheless, target deficit-to-GDP ratio of 6.0% for 2011 was significantly missed as the outturn published in the Spring 2012 EP Notification unveiled a deficit of 8.5% of GDP for 2011. This deviation was a major surprise to independent analysts. Indeed, in December 2011 the public deficit consensus forecast was 6.5% of GDP. The fall in government revenue associated with the second dip of the double-dip recession and significant spending slippage by regional governments, were the main factors behind the budgetary deviation. In the latter respect, lack of transparency in budgetary execution during the year and statistical misreporting of regional public spending in real-time prevented a correct anticipation of the deviation (see Pedregal et al., 2014) . The lax fiscal behaviour of regional governments occurred despite steps taken by central government to increase the pressure on regional governments for them to respect their deficit limits, e.g. by strictly linking debt issuance authorization to the approval of rebalancing plans and effective budget execution. The EDP deficit-reduction path was revised subsequently by the European Council, granting an extension for the correction of the excessive deficit.
As of end-2011, a more comprehensive consolidation programme was launched, with changes to existing taxes and the introduction of new taxes (in particular, environmental), and broad-based spending policies. Tax measures are described in detail in Table 1 (for more specific Between 2009 and 2014 the total net increase in public debt due to these operations was of 54bn 9 The Spanish government applied for financial assistance from the Member states to support its banks, as it envisaged potential problems in carrying out the necessary recapitalisation of its banks independently as a result of its difficulties accessing the markets. On 20 July 2012, the Eurogroup approved the bank programme.
The programme was for a maximum volume of 100bn euro and had an envisaged duration of 18 months. All of the implementation reports from the European Commission and the ECB confirmed that the programme's conditions were being met on schedule. The final amount disbursed was far less than half of the ceiling of 100bn, and the programme ended on 23 January 2014, half a year before the deadline. Also, since July 2014 the government has been making early repayments of its ESM loan.
euro (around 5% of 2014's GDP). 10 Part of the initial public funds has already started to be recovered.
Central government also put in place a number of financial funds to support regional governments in trouble. Despite potential moral hazard problems, which can be particularly acute in such a fiscally decentralized country as Spain, the funds were instrumental in stopping region-to-region 
Policy responses: an opportunity for reform?
Changes to taxes and benefits
Tax reform during the crisis affected most taxes, in particular direct and indirect taxes. It is hard to assess the distributional impact of so many changes on the tax side. It is also potentially misleading to do this using a static micro-simulation model (as other papers in this special issue do for other countries) because of the significant concurrent increase in unemployment, the correction of other macroeconomic imbalances and the more general structural break in the potential output of Spain during the crisis, with a rebalancing of production across economic sectors still ongoing. The combination of these factors makes it difficult to assess the general equilibrium effects of changes to taxes on the income distribution. However, it is possible to provide a broad outline of the measures taken and the effects these might have had.
On the tax side, the main revenue-raising reforms were to VAT and personal income tax. The main rate of VAT was increased from 16% to 21% between 2010 and 2012, alongside some increases in the reduced rates. At the same time there were increases in income tax increases targeted at those on higher-incomes. These crisis-related measures were designed with the principle aim of controlling the budget deficit, while income distribution concerns were only a subsidiary objective.
What is more, the issue of the "optimal policy design" was not fully internalized, given fiscal consolidation pressures. More recent measures, like the tax reform enacted in 2015, may have somewhat shifted the focus. This reform aims at reducing the burden of direct taxation, particularly on lower-earners, by reducing marginal tax rates on personal income. Specifically, the number of tax tranches is to be reduced from 7 to 5, and the tax rates within each tranche are to be lowered, while significant tax credits are also to be made available to certain groups of taxpayers (lowincome earners, families with children). Overall this income tax reform is expected to have a budgetary net cost of between 0.5% and 1% of GDP in 2015 and 2016. 11 Concerning changes to benefits, Table 2 Figure 10 ). In the bottom decile group, though, the fall in non-pension benefits was the most influential policy. The negative effect on this group might be related to the incidence of unemployment insurance and assistance cuts as of 2011 (see Table 2 ) and restraints on other social benefits relating to children and benefits paid by regional governments (see Appendix 3 in De Agostini et al., 2014).
Changes to public service spending
Most of the reduction in public spending as a share of national income is being brought about by reductions in spending on public services. The cuts were deep between 2010 and 2013. As Table 3 shows, over this period there were nominal declines in almost all areas of public service expenditure. Between 2013 and 2018, policy plans imply spending falling further as a share of GDP. However, over this period, this is intended to be achieved by spending growing in nominal terms but less quickly than nominal GDP; the only exceptions are general public service expenditure and, to a lesser extent, environmental protection, which are set to continue declining in nominal terms. Current plans up to 2018 are to rely more on measures of a structural nature, rather than on further bold cost-cutting actions. According to the April 2015 Stability Programme, public expenditure will fall from 44% of GDP in 2014 to 38.4% in 2018. In the next Section we elaborate a bit more on the nature of the "fiscal-structural" reforms that are to drive the spending side of the budget in the medium-term.
Structural fiscal reforms
Many structural reforms affecting the labour and products markets have been implemented since 2010 (see Ortega and Peñalosa, 2013) . In this section, though, we focus on the main reforms of this kind that affect the government sector.
Fiscal rules: budgetary framework, transparency and the Independent Fiscal Responsibility Authority
The coordination of the fiscal effort across levels of the public administration, as well as the achievement of overall budgetary targets in the past few years, owes a great deal to the changes implemented in the framework of fiscal rules, both national and supranational. The national budgetary framework was also reinforced with the creation of an "Independent Fiscal Responsibility Authority" (AIReF) which is tasked with fiscal policy analysis, advisory and monitoring functions to ensure government compliance with the principle of budgetary stability, and the evaluation and validation of government's economic forecasts. Such institution could progressively play a role in strengthening the credibility of fiscal policies in Spain. The AIReF is formally independent, and its president is appointed by the Parliament, even though organically it depends on the Ministry of Finance, which has approval rights on its budget. The AIReF is granted access to all public administration's data and information in order to perform its tasks.
Structural public spending reforms
Since 2012, the Spanish government has adopted various initiatives to reform the public administration and increase efficiency, under the umbrella of the so-called Commission to Reform the Public Administrations (CORA). The commission organized its proposals in four areas: administrative duplication; administrative simplification; service delivery and shared services; and institutional administration. The 2013 CORA report includes 217 proposals that affect all levels of government (see OECD, 2014). In fact, being Spain an extremely fiscally-decentralized country, initiatives to, for example, eliminate duplication among tiers of the public administration, and to develop means of maximizing synergies among administrations are warranted. Ongoing simplification processes also relate to public corporations. In addition, within the "administrative duplication block", a local government reform was introduced in 2014. This reform seeks to remove duplication between the local government and other government sub-sectors, to streamline the number of local entities and to rationalize the services they provide.
Pension system reforms
The gradual ageing of the population present in the demographic projections for most developed (and many developing) countries, and its pressure on pension spending, also applies to Spain. With a view to counteracting these trends a number of pension reforms have been passed over the past few years in Spain. A first reform of the pension system was approved in 2011. Among other changes, the legal retirement age was increase from 65 to 67 (through a gradual increase from 2013 to 2027), and the earnings record used to determine full pension benefits and the number of years of contributions required to obtain full pension benefits will gradually increase, among other changes (see Banco de España, 2011, Box 2.3). Further changes to the pension system were also passed in early 2013. Most importantly, in 2014, a more comprehensive law was passed to regulate the "sustainability factor" and "revaluation index". The sustainability factor ties the evolution of pensions to life expectancy and will be applied as of 2019. The revaluation index, which is applied as of 2014, replaces the annual pension indexation based on inflation with a formula which takes into account the structural deficit or surplus of the social security system, subject to minima and maxima of +0.25% and "CPI inflation + 0.5%", respectively (see Ramos, 2014 ).
According to the latest available official estimates, the ratio of age-related spending to GDP should be stabilized in the long-term by these reforms (see Table 4 ). In particular, compared to a projected pre-reform increase of pension expenditure of 3.6% of GDP between 2010 and 2060, the updated simulation yields a slight fall of 0.4%. The main driving forces behind the impact of the reforms are the operation of the revaluation index and the sustainability factor (see Ramos, 2014 ).
Conclusions
Spain's public finances have been under significant stress during the crisis, despite the apparently benign initial conditions (i.e. the fact that, before the crisis struck, the Spanish government was running a fiscal surplus and had a low level of public debt). The impact of the crisis and an initial phase of counter-cyclical activism exacerbated the existing (structural) fiscal vulnerabilities. To deal with the correction of fiscal imbalances, a significant number of tax, public spending and institutional policy measures were implemented between 2010 and 2014, some of them with a medium-to long-term bearing on fiscal sustainability.
In spite of the bold steps taken, major challenges still remain on the fiscal side, as the stock of public debt in 2014 was close to 100% of GDP, a deep tax reform is still pending, and the yields of ongoing fiscal-structural reforms are yet to be seen in full. If the Draft Budget is not approved in time, the previous Budget is extended automatically
